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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BOWEN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, Case No. 15,137 
RUTH OLSEN, 
Defendant-
Responden t. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by a prospective buyer of real estate 
to compel specific performanc~ of an option contract which 
is part of an executed earnest money agr2ement for the sale 
of real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 17, 1977, the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District, Judge J. Robert Bullock presiding, after 
a trial on the issues by the court, ruled that the plaintiff 
was not entitled to a decree of soecif ic performance on the 
basis that plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action. 
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Defendant's counterclaim was also dismisserl on t· 
basis of failure to pr~ve a cause of action. 
ment against plaintiff is being app2aled. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Only tlie 
The appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's 
findings and judgm2nt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For simplicity in reference, the titles "plaintiff' 
and "defendant" will be used herein. 
In October 1975, the plaintiff asked Ronald Gardner. 
hereinafter "Gardner", a licensed real estate agent, to 
assist him in finding some property for the plaintiff to 
use as a bicycle shop. Gardner contacted Lee Bamgartner, 
a licensed real estate agent with whom defendant had listf'. 
the property which is the subject of this lawsuit, and "'rL 
is referred to in the record as parcel "A", and which hari 
frontage on Second West Street, in Pr0vn, Utah. Immedi-
ately to the east of parcel "A" is a smaller piece of pre"' 
erty described in the record as parcel "B". Bo th parcels 
"A" and "B" were a small part of defendant's propert; 
which was listed for sale with Mr. Bamgartner. 
-2-
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Plaintiff was desirous of purchasing the frontage 
rroperty, parcel "A", but Gardner was told by Lee Bamgartner 
th3t said parcel was not available because another party 
had already made an offer on it (R. 17). On November 4, 
1975, plaintiff had Gardner present an offer to buy parcel 
"B" (Exhibit P-17, R 17), and gave Gardner $1,000.00 to 
hold as earnest money (R. 100). That offer was refused. 
Plaintiff then had Gardner present a second offer to pur-
chase parcel "B" on December 22, 1975 (Exhibit D-5, R. 17, 
18). The earnest money agreement had not yet been signed 
by either party, but there was a tentative assent by defen-
dant to sell parcel "B" to the plaintiff at that time. 
On January 7, 1976, Gardner took the December 22 earnest 
money agreement back to plaintiff for his signature. (R. 27). 
At that time, plaintiff expressed a desire to acquire more 
property from the defendant and instructed Gardner to add 
to the earnest money an option to buy other land to the 
east of parcel "B" and an op ti on to buy parcel "A", which 
is west of parcel "B". The option for property to the east 
of parcel "A" was never exercised and has no significance 
in the lawsuit. The next day, January 8, 1976, Gardner 
wrote the options into the earnest money agreement, but only 
after defendant and Lee Bamgartner insisted that a stipula-
tion giving defendant ingress and egress be put in at the 
-3-
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same time. After the options and the ingress-egress stinc-
lation were written in, the defendant signed the earnest 
money (Exhibit D-6, R. 20, 21, 27-28, 44, 57-58, 71, 10\i. 
The closing on parcel "b" was set for February 20, 
1976, (Line 15, Exhibit D-6) and the option on the land 
east of parcel "B" was to be good for six months from the 
time title was clear (Lines 49-50, Exhibit D-6). The opti··-
on parcel "A" was understood to be a "back-up option" to 
the previously mentioned off er by defendant to sell to 
another and was to be on the same terms as the prior offer. 
It was to be good for 90 days from the time notice of releio 
of the first offer was given to plaintiff (Lines 50-57, 
Exhibit D-6). Plaintiff knew the general terms of the prior 
offer on parcel "A" (R. 95, 101-102), although there was 
some confusion about the identity of the party making the 
first offer. The prior offer had been made by one Larry 
Walters, but at times both parties were under the impressic 
that Walters was acting for "Iron Horse", a corporation (R. 
21, 98, 113, 143-144). Later on the plaintiff and Gardner 
were also told by Lee Bamgartner that a Mr. Castle was als 
part of the "Iron Horse" arrangement (R. 34). Castle and 
Walters were working on developing the land together, and 
Walters had authorized Castle to act as his agent (R. lli-
116). The question of what parties were working together 
-4-
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becomes important later on because of the issue of notice 
to plaintiff that the previous option on parcel "A" had been 
given up. 
Despite the confusion as to the identity of the 
prior offeror, there is no doubt that all parties were talk-
ing about the same parcel "A" (R. 60-64). 
By its terms, the prior offer made by Larry Walters 
was to expire on December 31, 1975, (R. 37, 108, Exhibits 
D-3, D-4) but the closing date had been set for February 
13, 1976 (R. 85). Walters, however, on the date of the 
closing, notified the defendant that he would not be able 
to close on parcel "A" because he was unable to get the 
necessary financial backing. However, Walters received 
an extension of the earnest money agreement to April 7, 
1976, at which time that offer was changed to other prop-
erty which Walters subsequently purchased. This extension 
was granted by reason of Walter's paying $4,500.00 to Lee 
Bamgartner on March 29, 1976 (R. 109, 112, Exhibit 19). 
On or about February 17, 1976, Castle made an offer 
to defendant which was for a substantially higher price than 
the option held by plaintiff (R. 78-79). While plaintiff 
knew that Castle had been dealing with defendant, he had 
been given to understand that Castle was part of the "Iron 
Horse" arrangement (R. 98); and as previously mentioned, 
-5-
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he believed that Castle was the agent of Walters (R. llS-
116). 
On March 11, 1976, plaintiff bought an additional 
twenty feet of land from defendant (Exhibit D-6, R. 29, 
7 9) • 
On April 7, Castle came to an agreement with defer.-
dant regarding parcel "A"; and on April 9, Walters came to 
an agreement with defendant as to the property to the nortr 
(R. 80). 
There is no evidence of plaintiff ever personally 
receiving notice that the prior agreement with Walters or 
"Iron Horse" as to parcel "A" had ever been terminated. 
Plaintiff indirectly received the information that Walters 
was buying the land north of parcel "A" and not parcel "A" 
itself on about May 20 from Walters (R. 99). 
There was conflicting evidence about whether Gard-
ner had ever been directly informed that the "Iron Horse" 
offer had been released (R. 42-43, 46, 76-78, 84). 
After the April 20 closing on parcel "B", at which 
time the ingress and egress across parcel "B" was prejlared, ! 
plaintiff learned of the separate agreement of defendant 
with Castle (R. 24, 25). 
On May 25, 1976, a letter was sent by plaintiff to 
defendant giving notice of plaintiff's desire to exercise 
the option. 
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While Gardner did present various offers and pro-
posals to defendant and others, Gardner was acting at all 
times under the supervision of the plaintiff. Gardner never 
did anything without the express permission and direction 
of plaintiff (R. 25, 27, 105, 106). Plaintiff personally 
appeared for his part of all closing (R. 31, 32, 66) and 
signed all documents himself (R. 25, 31, 32, 53, 54, 95, 
101) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
UNDER THE LIMITED AUTHORITY GIVEN TO RONALD 
GARDNER, IT IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW TO FIND 
THAT HE HAD AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE OPTION 
The trial court found that Gardner was plaintiff's 
agent for all purposes in the transactions between plain-
tiff and defendant (Findings of Fact 6). Plaintiff contends 
that Gardner had only limited authority to present offers 
and that Gardner always acted under plaintiff's direction. 
Plaintiff, therefore, contends that the trial judge erred 
in finding that Gardner had such broad powers. Such a broad 
holding is not supported by the evidence presented at trial 
and is contrary to the law regarding real estate agents and 
real tors. 
-7-
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In a suit in equity such as this one for specific 
performance, the Supreme Court reviews both questions of 
fact and law, While this is done in the light most favc,r-
able to the party prevailing at trial, the trial court's 
judgment must at least be supported by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 
356 (1970). Plaintiff contends that Gardner had no irnpliec 
or apparent authority to waive the option. It is uncon-
tested that Gardner was never given any express authority 
to waive plaintiff's option on parcel "A". 
The real estate broker-client relationship is one 
of agency, and the law of agency governs that relationship 
throughout. 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §30, p. 795. Real esta:. 
brokers are special agents with limited powers. 12 Am Jur 
2d, Brokers, §66, p. 821 provides: 
A real estate br0ker is, generally speaking, 
a special agent with limited powers and is, 
therefore, in dealing with land, closely 
restricted within the terms of his agency. 
His authority is only such as is specifically 
conferred, either expressly or by necessary 
implication. He must keep within the bounds 
of the authority conferred upon him, other-
wise the principal will not be bound. Persons 
dealing with him are chargeable with notice 
of limitation of his power and put upon inquiry 
to ascertain the extent of his authority. 
In determining the extent of his authority, 
his contract will be strictly construed, and 
any doubts will be resolved against him. 
-8-
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Because their powers are limited, they are better described 
as realtors rather than agents. 
Business usage and customs are also considered in 
evaluating the extend of an agent's implied authority. 3 
Am -1ur 2d, Agency, §72, p. 474. Gardner was not authorized 
to do anything without the express authority of the plain-
tiff (R. 25, 105, 106). Gardner was empowered by both the 
earnest money agreement and plaintiff's oral instructions 
to present several different offers to the defenrlant and 
Cast le. Gardner was asked by plaintiff to help advise the 
plaintiff in qualifying with the city planners. Gardner 
took care of the details in preparation for the closing, 
and both Gardner and Lee Bamgartner were present at the 
real estate closing on parcel "B". Together they prepared 
the papers for parcel "B" even though the plaintiff and 
defendant appeared separately for their respective parts 
of the transaction. All of these activities constitute the 
normal and expected conduct of realtors with limited powers, 
because they are details collaterally related to the agent's 
authority. It is also common knowledge that a realtor's 
authority does not extend to making binding decisions for 
his client without express authority. Gardner, therefore, 
had no impled authority to waive the option. 
-9-
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Because there was not express or implied authorit 
to waive the option, the trial court's finding of a waii'rr 
can only be based on the theory of apparent authority. 
Apparent authority is that which, though not actually 
granted, the principal knowingly permits the agent to 
cise or which he holds him out as possessing. 3 Arn Jur 2d, 
Agency, §73, p. 475. A principal may also clothe an agent 
with apparent authority by negligently failing to disappro·:o 
of the agent's acts which cause the public to believe the 
agent has authority. 3 Arn Jur 2d Agency, §74, p. 477. In 
the case at bar, there is no evidence that plaintiff neg-
ligently failed to disapprove of Gardner's acts. Plaintif' 
was never made aware of the alleged waiver and promptly 
sought to exercise his option when notified of the prior 
option failing. 
For an agent's acts to be binding on his principal. 
there must have been (1) consent or knowing permission of 
the agent's acts by the principal; (2) knowledge by the 
third party of the principal's acts of consent; and (3) 
reliance by the third party to his derriment on that fact. 
3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, §75 p. 477; B & R Supply Co. v. Brit!.£· 
hurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Banko~ 
Lake v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Chr~ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (1975); Mal~~~· 
100 Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208 (1941). 
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There was no evidence offered to show that Gardner 
had surh broad authority except what other claims Gardner 
himself said regarding a waiver, which statement is dis-
puted hy Gardner (R. 42, 43, 46, 76-78, 84). 
There is no dispute, however, over the fact that 
plaintiff had never given Gardner any authority by either 
signing for or releasing the plaintiff's rights in parcel 
"A" (R. 105, 106). Proof of an agent's authority must 
come from acts by his principal and not from the agent's 
own representations or activities. Santi v. Denver & R.G. 
W.R. Co., 21 Utah 2d 157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968); B & R Supply 
Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P. 2d 1216 (1972); 
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of President of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (1975); 
Malia v. Giles, 100 Utah 562, 114 P. 2d 208 (1941). 
Because there was no act by plaintiff which could 
be construed as giving Gardner apparent authority to waive 
the option, any findings based on apparent authority must 
fail because there is not evidence of the first necessary 
element, an act by the principal which gives the apparent 
authority. The very essence of this case is that, even 
assuming Gardner did orally waive the option, any waiver 
was clearly beyond the scope of his authority, was unautho-
rized and unknown by the plaintiff, and, therefore, not 
-11-
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binding on the plaintiff. This court, in one of thp re,· 
cases dealing with the issue of a realtor's oral waiver 
of option rights said that the rights of a seller on an 
option contract cannot be orally waived by a realtor unle;. 
specifically authorized to do so. Equitable v. Nielse_n, 
30 Utah 2d 433, 519 P.2d 243 (1974). The Equitable case 
dealt with a realtor's waiver of a seller's rights while 
this case deals with a realtor's waiver of a buyer's 
rights. Equitable was a suit by a realtor for a commissior, 
but the basic principal is the same. A realtor's unautho-
rized oral waiver of option rights is not binding on the 
party the realtor sought to bind. An agent's improper 
assumption of authority is not binding on his principal. 
3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, §78, P. 482. 
The defendant was also chargeable with knowledge 
of Gardner's limited authority as a real tor and had the 
duty to ascertain his authority to waive any option agree-
ment. A principal is not bound if his agent is exceeding 
his authority, and the third party knew or should have kno·•· 
of the improper act through reasonable diligence. 3 Am Jur 
2d Agency, §77, p. 481; 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers §65-66, PP· 
819-821; Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummell, In~, 
99 Utah 188, 103 P.2d 650 (1940). Because of defendant's 
own failure to ascertain Gardner's limited authoritl', she 
-12-
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cannot be allowed to prevail by claiming that she relied 
to her detriment on her own falure to ascertain the author-
ity of those with whom she was dealing. A principal is 
allowed to assume that third parties dealing with his agent 
will not be negligent in failing to ascertain the limits 
of the agent's authority. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, §78, p. 
482-483. 
Because plaintiff had a firm contract right repre-
sented by the option, his position is analogous to that 
of a person being desirous of selling his land. Where the 
seller engages the services of a realtor, giving him author-
ity only to locate a buyer who is ready, willing and able 
to purchase the land under a standard broker's listing, the 
law is clear that the realtor cannot bind the seller to give 
up his own land if the realtor signs a contract for sale 
himself. The realtor's only authority is to bring the par-
ties together, absent specific authority to the contrary. 
12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §71, pp. 824-826, 43 ALR 2d 1014 at 
1015; Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 
(1971). Likewise, plaintiff should not be forced to sur-
render his option rights because his realtor erroneously 
waives the option without authority. 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff contends 
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
-13-
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support the conclusion that Gardner had express, implied 
or apparent authority from plaintiff to waive the optlnn. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S READING OF THE EARNEST 
MONEY AS ENTIRELY ABROGATED OR MERGED INTO 
THE SUBSEQUENT DEED AND AGREEMENT WAS CON-
TRARY TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW 
The trial court found that by the express terms of 
the earnest money receipt and "option" to purchase, the 
option on parcel "A" contained therein was abrogated at the 
time of the final contract. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's interpre-
tation of the earnest money failed to take into account all 
of the terms of the earnest money and that the court is, 
therefore, factually in error. 
A trial court's interpretation of a written documec' 
is not binding on appeal; and this court may, therefore, 
interpret the earnest money agreement anew, as long as 
extrinsic evidence is not needed to interpret it because 
of ambiguities. Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, Utah 2d lf' 
321 P.2d 221 (1953); Lake v. Hermes Associates, 552 P.2d 
126 (1976). The trial court looked at the express terms 
of the agreement only and found them unambiguous as to tt,, 
-14-
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issue of abrogation. This court, therefore, may interpret 
the earnest money agreement anew. Line 39 through 41 of 
the earnest money agreement provide the following, which is 
µart of the printed form: 
It is understood and agreed that the terms 
written in this receipt constitute the entire 
Preliminary Contract between the purchaser 
and the Seller, and that no verbal statement 
made by anyone relative to this transaction 
shall be construed to be a part of this 
transaction unless incorporated in writing 
herein. If is further agreed that execution 
of the final contract shall abrogate this 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. 
(Emphasis added) 
The trial court based is findings of abrogation on 
this language and the subsequent papers prepared at the 
closing of parcel "B" but failed to consider two other very 
important facts apparent on the face of the earnest money 
agreement and subsequent papers on parcel "B". These are 
the following: (1) The earnest money itself provides on 
line 25 for a closing on February 29, 1976, but for the option 
on property to the east of parcel "B" and the option on 
parcel "A" to be good for six months (line 49) and 90 days 
after notice of release of a prior offer (line 54) respec-
lively. These time periods clearly show an intent for the 
options to survive the closing, which was set for less than 
60 days after the agreement was accepted and only 79 days 
from the date the earnest money was filled out; (2) The 
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earnest money form, although printed in the singular tense. 
was really being used to evidence three separate agreement-
a contract for sale on parcel "B" and options on parcel "'" 
and additional property east of parcel "B". It is a c om~or. 
procedure in the real estate business to use one form surh 
as this for several lots or parcels which are in close pre:·: 
imity to each other or otherwise related. A contract for 
the sale of real estate and an option contract are differer.: 
contracts with different obligations, and each must be treat, 
separately. 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §28, pp. i-
206. 
Because of these additional facts, the only way to 
give a proper constuction to all of the terms of the earnes: 
money agreement is to rule that each separate agreement w!L 
be abrogated when the final contract as to that parcel is 
executed. This seems to be the only reasonable constructic' 
under the rules of construction. 
The rule is well settled that where part of 
a contract is written or typed and part is 
printed, and the written or typed and the 
printed parts are apparently inconsistent 
or there is reasonable doubt as to the sense 
and meaning of the whole, th·e words in writing 
or typing will control. 
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, 271 p. 679; Holland v. Brown, 
15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964). 
Where the written or typed and printed parts may b< 
reconciled by any reasonable construction, as by regard!n; 
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one as a qualification of the other, that construction must 
be given, because it cannot be assumed that the parties 
intended to insert ineffective provisions. 17 Am Jur 2d 
Contracts, §271, p. 679. 7 7 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, 
§60, p. 245. 
Under these rules, the only possible conclusion can 
be that the two options on the separate parcels of ground 
were not destroyed by the execution of a final contract for 
the third parcel which was parcel "B" and that the trial 
court's construction should, therefore, be reversed, even 
if the words are construed against plaintiff, who was the 
party responsible for the choice of words used. 
The parties could have later intended to abrogate 
or otherwise surrender the options at the closing on parcel 
"B", but the evidence is that ,parcel "A" was not discussed 
at the time of closing parcel "B". Plaintiff also contends 
that the trial court erred in applying the law to this clos-
ing on parcel "B" by ruling that the option on parcel "A" 
was abrogated or otherwise excluded by the closing on parcel 
Abrogation is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as 
an act of annulment, repeal, destruction, or subrogation 
of authority. Abrogation is basically another name for the 
doctrine of merger, which is that all prior negotiations 
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and understandings on the same subject as a written 
contra 
are extinguished if not expressly incorporated into the" 
ten document, and that after a valid substituted agreeme~t 
executed, a prior written agreement is extinguished. 17 ,\· 
Jur 2d, Contracts, §483, p. 952. However, a key requiremec: 
is that the subsequent agreement must deal with the same 
subject matter to extinguish the prior agreement. 17 Am Jc: 
2d, Contracts, §483, p. 952. 
In the case at bar, the parties were dealing with 
three different parcels with different options on two and 
a sales contact on one. Just as exercise of one of the 
options would not abrogate the other option or sales contra," 
so the closing on the sales contract did not effect the ind<· 
pendent options with their separate terms. As the trial 
judge correctly held, the options were supported by consid-
eration (Finding 8, R. 100-101) and were valid in themselve' 
even if the sale of parcel "B" had been rescinded. 
The doctrine of merger generally only applied to 
prior agreements that differ from a final agree!'lent that 
pertains to the same piece of proper•y. The question usua:: 
revolves around merger of covenants and oral promises into 
the deed of conveyance. 7 7 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchase'., 
§290 et. seq.; Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 
198 (1966), Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 42, i:: 
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p,2d 689 (1918). Under that reasoning, in order to protect 
the easement for ingress and egress, which was the consid-
eration for the options being given, that document had to 
be prepared at the closing on parcel "B" because it was 
on parcel "B" and would otherwise have been merged into the 
agreement represented by the deed to parcel "B". 
Some covenants, however, because they are sufficiently 
independent of the agreement incorporated in a deed, are 
considered to be "collateral", and, therefore, not merged 
into the deed. 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §291, 
p. 450, 38 ALR 2d 1310 at 1320, §6. But even these "collat-
eral" agreements are concerning the one parcel of land in 
question. 
Where there are three separate parcels in question, 
therefore, it seems clear a fortiori that there could be 
a merger by deed only as to the property being conveyed, 
which was parcel "B" at the closing on April 20, 1976. 
A foreign case closely on point is Mccraw v. Richard-
2_Cl_I!_, 459 P.2d 620 (Oklahoma 1969), in which a deed conveying 
one of two parcels previously contracted for but which erro-
neously excluded the other was held not to extinguish the 
buyer's claim to the excluded parcel. 
In the case at bar, there was never a clearly expressed 
intent that the option rights should merge with the conveyance 
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of parcel "B". On the contrary, the earnest money agree-
ment properly construed expressed the intent that the 
options survive the conveyance of parcel "B". Plaintiff, 
therefore, alleges that the option on parcel "A" was r.ot 
abrogated or otherwise eliminated as a matter of law and 
urges that the trial court's decision be reversed because 
plaintiff is still entitled to specific performance under 
the option. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
In order for a party to be entitled to specific per· 
formance of an option, he must have complied with the opti:· 
requirements in all respects. Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Uta·. 
2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970); Lincoln Land and Development C 
v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 (1971); Nancev. 
Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (1974). Plaintiff gave notice tc 
defendant that he wanted to exercise the option on parcel 
"A" and contends that notice was all that was required unV 
the terms of the option. Tender of 11ayment was not requir• 
under the option prior to the closing for parcel "A". Tk 
fore, plaintiff complied with his duty under the option·,".• 
notice of exercising the option was sent. 
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Plaintiff also contends that he is entitled to spe-
cific performance under the terms of the option because 
oefendant never directly gave him notice that the prior 
nption had expired. Plaintiff had to find out second hand 
from Walters. Defendant claims to have asked Gardner if 
plaintiff was exercising his option and that this was notice 
to plaintiff. Because Gardner was not the agent of plaintiff 
except for the purposes of negotiating or presenting offers 
as discussed in Point One, notice to Gardner was not binding 
on plaintiff. Specific performance then is a proper remedy 
for the plaintiff in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff alleges that the record herein and the 
legal principles applicable to the facts demonstrated by 
such record can reasonably and justly lead this honorable 
court to the following conclusions: 
1. The authority given by plaintiff to the real 
estate agent was a "special" or "limited" power and did 
not include authority to waive the option. 
2. A real estate agent does not have authority to 
waive an option agreement executed by its client without 
express written authority to do so. 
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3. The basis upon which apparent authority mov t. 
found, e.g. plaintiff knowingly permitting Gardner to '•l, 
the option or negligently failing to disapprove Gardner', 
acts is not present in this case; and hence, there can b, 
findings of apparent authority. 
4. There were three separate agreements embodic1. 
in the "Earnest Money" document designated as Exhibit D-c 
5. Each of the three agreements in Exhibit n-6 
with different parcels of real property. 
These conclusions lead to the ultimate reversal'" 
the decision of the trial court and a finding that plain· 
is entitled to specific performance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JER IL B. WILSON 
STOTT, YOUNG AND WILSON 
84 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84601 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and exact copies 
"[the foregoing llrief of Appel1ant were mailed to Jackson 
Howard, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 120 East 300 
:1 0 rt h. Provo , UT 8 4 6 0 1 , this -'.2 /( day of June , 1 9 7 7 . 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
